15 ideas
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |