63 ideas
16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |