Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Contingent Identity', 'Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic'' and 'Theology and Falsification'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / b. Religious Meaning
Claims about God don't seem to claim or deny anything tangible, so evidence is irrelevant [Flew, by PG]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / d. Religious Falsification
You can't claim a patch of land is tended by a 'gardener' if there is no evidence, and all counter-evidence is rejected [Flew, by PG]
Religious people seem unwilling to accept any evidence that God does not love us, so their claim is unfalsifiable [Flew, by PG]