Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Contingent Identity', 'The soul's dependence on the body' and 'The Analysis of Matter'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
23269 Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
6402 In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
14732 A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
14733 An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6418 Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
23266 The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
23219 Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
23264 Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
23220 The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23265 The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
23268 We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
21706 At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B]