Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Contingent Identity', 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' and 'Physics and Philosophy'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


42 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg]
Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg]
Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg]
It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg]