Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Internalism Exposed', 'Sophistical Refutations' and 'Shame and Necessity'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
2676 Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
2675 Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
2677 Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
2674 Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
16967 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
16149 Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
11840 Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
6871 We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
6872 Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
6874 Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6873 Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
6875 Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2181 It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
2176 There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
2174 Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
2178 In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
2169 Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
2172 The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
2179 If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
2180 If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
2175 There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]