Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Internalist Conception of Justification', 'Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking)' and 'The Metaphysics of Properties'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
10468 A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
4262 If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
10471 Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
10749 Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
10750 Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10502 We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
10747 Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
10748 Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10719 There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
10721 If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
10716 There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
10720 We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10714 The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver]
10715 There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10738 Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
10739 The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
10740 The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
10741 Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
10742 Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10472 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10724 Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver]
7963 Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver]
10730 If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
10727 Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
7962 Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
10722 Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
10744 Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
10726 Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver]
10725 Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
10745 Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
18258 We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
16784 Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
10499 We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
10501 A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
10500 No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
10746 Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver]