Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Internalism Exposed', 'The Source of Necessity' and 'The Architecture of Theories'

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13 ideas

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce]