15 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |