12 ideas
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| 18253 | I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege] |
| 18166 | The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege] |
| 18269 | Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege] |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |