Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Internalism Exposed', 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth' and 'Perception'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
3745 Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
3742 Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
3744 The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
3749 What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
3746 Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
3747 Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3743 We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
3748 Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
7630 Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7632 Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
7635 Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7638 One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
7642 The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
7640 Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund]
7641 Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
6871 We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
6872 Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
6874 Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6873 Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
6875 Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
7637 Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]