Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Internalism Exposed', 'Elbow Room: varieties of free will' and 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]