Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Internalism Exposed', 'Utilitarianism' and 'A Powerful Particulars View of Causation'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


54 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson]
Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson]
Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill]
The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill]
Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill]
Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill]
Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill]
Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill]
No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson]
Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson]
Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson]
Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson]
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson]
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson]
Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson]
Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson]