12 ideas
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
| 17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
| 17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
| 17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| 17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |