18 ideas
| 18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
| 18086 | Weierstrass eliminated talk of infinitesimals [Weierstrass, by Kitcher] |
| 18092 | Weierstrass made limits central, but the existence of limits still needed to be proved [Weierstrass, by Bostock] |
| 14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
| 14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
| 1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
| 1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
| 2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
| 2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |