13 ideas
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 19514 | Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose] |
| 19515 | We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose] |
| 19510 | In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose] |
| 19516 | Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose] |
| 19511 | If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose] |
| 13165 | Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus] |
| 9569 | The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus] |