17 ideas
| 16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
| 16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
| 16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
| 16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
| 1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
| 1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
| 1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
| 16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
| 16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
| 16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
| 16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |