15 ideas
| 22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 15327 | Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten] |
| 15343 | Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten] |
| 14966 | The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta] |
| 14967 | Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta] |
| 16328 | Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach] |
| 22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |