16 ideas
| 15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
| 15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
| 15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
| 15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
| 15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
| 15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
| 3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
| 3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
| 3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
| 3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |