Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Internalism Exposed', 'Action' and 'Philosophy and the Nature of Language'

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33 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE]
A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE]
Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]