Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'Process and Reality' and 'Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation?'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
European philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato [Whitehead]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
With 'extensive connection', boundary elements are not included in domains [Whitehead, by Varzi]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
In Whitehead 'processes' consist of events beginning and ending [Whitehead, by Simons]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Whitehead held that perception was a necessary feature of all causation [Whitehead, by Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Whitehead replaced points with extended regions [Whitehead, by Quine]