Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study'' and 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws)'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege]
A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett]
Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]