Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'World and Essence', 'Shame and Necessity' and 'The Truth in Relativism'

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22 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2176 There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
2181 It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
2174 Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22450 If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
2178 In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
2169 Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
2172 The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
2179 If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
2180 If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
2175 There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]