14 ideas
11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
5880 | Xenocrates held that the soul had no form or substance, but was number [Xenocrates, by Cicero] |
11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |