Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' and 'Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
The Dao (Way) first means the road, and comes to mean the right way to live [Norden]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
The hermeneutic circle is either within the text, or between text and biased reader [Norden]
Heremeneutics is either 'faith' (examining truth) or 'suspicion' (looking for hidden motives) [Norden]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]