Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'Substance' and 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity'

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10 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
15391 A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality [Robb]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15392 If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts [Robb]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]