Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'Real Essentialism' and 'Elements of Intuitionism'

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31 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
12249 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
12242 Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
12238 The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
15938 Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
15939 For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
12254 Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
12253 If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12256 We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
12252 Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
12241 Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
12244 Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12240 Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
12247 Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
12258 Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12257 Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
12236 Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
12250 Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12234 Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
12235 Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
12237 Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
12245 Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
12246 What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12239 The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
12243 The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]