36 ideas
9307 | Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen] |
9297 | You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen] |
18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares] |
18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares] |
18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares] |
18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares] |
18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares] |
18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares] |
18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares] |
18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares] |
18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares] |
16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
9308 | If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen] |
9309 | Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen] |
18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares] |
9304 | Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen] |
9310 | The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen] |
9302 | We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen] |
9298 | We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen] |
9301 | Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen] |
9311 | We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen] |
9303 | The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen] |