13 ideas
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
6445 | You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |