Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'World and Essence', 'Are Freedom and Equality Compatible?' and 'Problems in Personal Identity'

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
3299 In logic identity involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x) and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z) [Baillie]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
21733 The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA]
21739 Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
21734 It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA]
21736 It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA]
21735 Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA]