14 ideas
| 6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
| 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
| 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
| 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
| 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
| 11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
| 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
| 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
| 6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |