Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'World and Essence', 'works' and 'Empty Names'

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
18935 Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
18945 Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18934 Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
18938 Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
18947 Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
3338 Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
5897 0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]