Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'World and Essence', 'Letters to Queen Charlotte' and 'works'

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17 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
23026 We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
13189 A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
19432 Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
19430 We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
19431 There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
9287 Bruno said that ancient Egyptian magic was the true religion [Bruno, by Yates]