Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius'' and 'Individuals in Aristotle'

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11 ideas

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Insurance on the original ship would hardly be paid out if the plank version was wrecked! [Frede,M]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz]