Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'On Euclidean Geometry' and 'The Central Questions of Philosophy'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
5331 You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
16886 The truth of an axiom must be independently recognisable [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
2611 It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
16520 We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
2613 The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
5328 Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
5330 Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
5326 Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
5325 Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5324 Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5322 Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
5327 Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5329 Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
2610 Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]