17 ideas
9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |