Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'Philosophy of Logic' and 'On Sensations (frags)'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
18951 For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
18953 Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
18949 The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
18952 '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
18958 In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
18954 Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
18956 Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
18962 Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
18961 We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18955 Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
18959 Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
18957 Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
18950 Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
2975 That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
18960 Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]