13 ideas
| 23877 | Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil] |
| 16660 | Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau] |
| 16626 | Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus] |
| 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
| 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
| 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
| 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
| 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
| 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
| 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
| 23878 | Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil] |
| 23879 | In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil] |
| 23880 | When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil] |