12 ideas
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
8970 | Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |