Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actualism and Possible Worlds', 'Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths'' and 'Human Freedom and the Self'

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19 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10185 Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10184 Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess]
10189 There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10186 If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess]
10187 Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess]
10188 How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
14664 Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
14666 Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
14662 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16472 Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
3444 If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
3446 For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm]
9268 If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
16470 Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
14663 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
3442 Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm]
3443 Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
3445 Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm]