Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars' and 'Essentials of Pragmatism'

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24 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
14794 Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
14792 A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
14793 The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]