Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Warrant and Proper Function', 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'' and 'The Runabout Inference Ticket'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
We need to know the meaning of 'and', prior to its role in reasoning [Prior,AN, by Belnap]
Maybe introducing or defining logical connectives by rules of inference leads to absurdity [Prior,AN, by Hacking]
Prior's 'tonk' is inconsistent, since it allows the non-conservative inference A |- B [Belnap on Prior,AN]
Prior rejected accounts of logical connectives by inference pattern, with 'tonk' his absurd example [Prior,AN, by Read]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]