57 ideas
| 10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
| 10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
| 3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
| 7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
| 10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
| 10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
| 3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
| 2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
| 3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
| 10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
| 10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
| 10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
| 10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
| 10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
| 10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
| 10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
| 10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
| 10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
| 10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
| 10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
| 10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
| 10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
| 10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
| 10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
| 10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
| 2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
| 15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
| 7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
| 10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
| 3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
| 3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
| 5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
| 2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
| 3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
| 2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
| 2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
| 3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
| 2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
| 3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
| 10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
| 2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
| 3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
| 3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
| 3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
| 3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
| 3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
| 2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
| 10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
| 10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
| 10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
| 10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |
| 1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG] |
| 1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG] |