14 ideas
| 10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
| 19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
| 10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
| 10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
| 10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
| 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
| 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
| 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
| 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
| 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
| 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
| 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
| 21132 | Domination is probable obedience by some group of persons [Weber] |