Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory' and 'Event Causation: counterfactual analysis'

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16 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]