21 ideas
12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
3016 | Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius] |
12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |