Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?', 'Introduction to 'Absolute Generality'' and 'Identity and Essence'

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26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
13451 The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
13452 Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
13449 We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
13450 Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13453 Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12132 Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
15834 Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
12140 Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11895 A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
12141 Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12137 De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12142 Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
12143 An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
12144 Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12139 Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12135 Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12130 a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
12138 Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
13448 The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]