16 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
9545 | Late in life Frege abandoned logicism, and saw the source of arithmetic as geometrical [Frege, by Chihara] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |