Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actualism and Possible Worlds', 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers' and 'The Condemnation of 1277'

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25 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
In future, only logical limits can be placed on divine omnipotence [Anon (Par), by Boulter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
It is heresy to teach that history repeats every 36,000 years [Anon (Par)]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is heresy to teach that natural impossibilities cannot even be achieved by God [Anon (Par)]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life [Anon (Par)]