29 ideas
19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
17000 | We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke] |
11868 | A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke] |
19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
17044 | A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke] |
16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
17058 | What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke] |
4970 | What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke] |
17059 | Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
4950 | Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
17003 | Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke] |
9221 | The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider] |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
17052 | The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke] |
19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
4969 | I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke] |
19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
4956 | A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke] |
17032 | Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke] |
19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |